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  This paper constructs a consistent series for the market value of UK Government debt over 
almost 300 years.  We analyse how monetary and fiscal policy affect the path of the price level in the 
UK.  Specifically, the paper examines the interactions between debts, deficits, the monetary base and 
the price level.  Overall, the price level has been closely related to the evolution of the base money 
supply.  Across different sample periods, there is little econometric evidence that fiscal policy has 
affected the course of the price level (or of the exchange rate under the Gold Standard).  Government 
debt has not significantly affected the base money stock either.  
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The interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, and their roles in the determination and 
control of the price level, has been the subject of continuous debate in the academic 
literature.  Informal rules governing the conduct of fiscal policy have also come to renewed 
prominence in recent years (e.g., in New Zealand and the UK).  Indeed, in Europe, the 
Growth and Stability Pact represents a more formal set of arrangements for fiscal policy that 
the countries participating in the single currency should adhere to.  The introduction of these 
rules is often justified as a complement to the reforms of monetary institutions; both types of 
arrangements are aimed at price stability.
( ) 1   
 
In the academic literature the traditional view on the determination of the price level is based 
on the Quantity Theory of Money.  Basically this argues that the equilibrium price level 
equates the real purchasing power of the money stock with the demand for real money 
balances.  The central implication is that control of the price level turns on control of the 
money stock.  However, in an influential analysis, Sargent and Wallace (1981) highlight 
some potential game-theoretic interactions between monetary and fiscal authorities.  Sargent 
and Wallace (op. cit.) show that under certain conditions the monetary authority might lose 
de facto control of the price level due to the need to raise seigniorage revenue.  As Sargent 
(1987) notes, the government’s present-value budget constraint (PVBC)  
 
“implies that monetary and fiscal policies must be co-ordinated in the sense that, given a 
process for [government expenditure], processes for [taxation] and [the money stock] cannot 
be chosen independently if they are to satisfy [the PVBC].”   
 
and that  
“statements that ‘inflation is entirely a monetary phenomenon’ must be interpreted and 
qualified in the light of the [PVBC].” 
  3Ultimately, however, even in the Sargent-Wallace set up, the price level is still explained in 
familiar monetary terms. 
 
Recently, the issue of aggregate price determination has resurfaced due to the so-called fiscal 
theory of the price level
( ) 2 .  This approach also emphasises the role of the PVBC, but in a 
somewhat different way to Sargent and Wallace.  The essence of the fiscal theory of the price 
level is as follows.  If future primary surpluses (including seigniorage revenue) are 
insufficient to meet existing government liabilities, the price level and interest rates must 
change to ensure that, in equilibrium, the PVBC is met.  Therefore, base money growth will 
no longer be the dominant determinant of the evolution of prices.  
 
The debate between the monetary and the fiscal approach to price level determination turns 
on the intertemporal behaviour of governments.  If the PVBC plays the role of a constraint, 
which governments observe when planning the temporal profile of taxation and expenditure, 
then the price level is determined in the quantity-theoretic way economists have typically 
thought it was.  
 
However, if the temporal profiles of taxation and government expenditure are not so co-
ordinated then, off equilibrium, the real value of existing debt may exceed, or fall short of, 
expected future surpluses.  As emphasised by Canzoneri and Diba (1996) and Canzoneri et 
al. (1997, 1999), the policy implications of this view are profound; in the face of what 
Woodford (1994, 1996, and 1998) labels a non-Ricardian regime
( ) 3  the monetary authority 
would lose control of the price level
( ) 4  and/or the exchange rate.  
 
  4There have been relatively few empirical analyses of either the Sargent-Wallace concerns or 
of the fiscal theory, and even less so for the UK.  Most recent empirical work has focussed on 
trying to distinguish between fiscal policy regimes (i.e., Ricardian versus non-Ricardian, see 
the discussion below) using US data.  For example, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999) 
analyse the response, over the post-war period, of US Debt to an innovation in the federal 
government’s budget balance.  They find that debt responds negatively to the primary surplus 
and conclude that the post-war US data are most plausibly interpreted as consistent with a 
Ricardian regime.  Looking at the ‘reverse’ response, Bohn (1998a) finds that US fiscal 
surpluses respond positively to debt.  He interprets this as evidence that US fiscal policy has 
been sustainable, and, although he does not comment directly on the fiscal theory of the price 
level, his results are again consistent with “traditional” views.  Cochrane (1998), on the other 
hand, argues that it is possible to model empirically post-war US inflation, independently of 
the money stock, using only surplus and debt data, and he provides simulations to this effect. 
 
In this paper we first construct a series for the market value of UK government debt that is 
broadly consistent over time, and that covers nearly three hundred years (1702-1996).   
Hitherto, a complete series has only been readily available from 1949 onwards.  The long 
time series of debt data allows us to incorporate in our analysis periods when major shocks to 
fiscal policy occurred (invariably in the form of wars).  We then develop a multivariate 
(Vector AutoRegression) framework to analyse the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on 
the course of the price level.  Specifically, we aim to identify how closely base money and 
the price level are related once we condition on fiscal variables.  We interpret our results as 
being in favour of a quantity-theoretical explanation of the price level; this suggests that 
some of the concerns raised by Sargent and Wallace have not been important factors in the 
evolution of aggregate prices in the UK.  We also find that certain correlations in the data are 
  5robust across different sample periods.  Furthermore, we observe that these results are 
consistent with relationships found in the US data.  This consistency across time and (two) 
countries may also help in the search for additional identifying assumptions that may be 
adopted in more formal analyses intended to distinguish Ricardian from non-Ricardian 
regimes.  
 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.  In section 2 we review briefly the relevant 
theoretical literature, and we discuss some empirical implications of the theories to be 
analysed.  In section 3 we describe the construction of the series for the market value of 
government debt and take an initial look at the data.  Section 4 presents our analysis of how 
monetary and fiscal variables influence the course of the price level over the long run of UK 
data.  We summarise and conclude in section 5. 
 
 
2.  Some Theory  
 
2.1  Theory 
Theoretically one can distinguish three broad approaches to the determination of equilibrium 
aggregate prices.
( ) 5   The first is the quantity-theoretic approach under monetary leadership.  
The second is the quantity theory under fiscal leadership.  And finally, the fiscal theory 
provides an essentially moneyless view of equilibrium price determination.  The essence of 
these approaches can be clarified by the following familiar equations.  Each period the 
consolidated public sector faces the following flow budget constraint: 
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  6Upper case letters denote a nominal magnitude.  Lower case letters denote real values, except 
, which is the nominal interest rate between period t and t+1.  B denotes the market value of 
one-period bonds, P is the price level, g is government expenditure, 
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where we have imposed the usual transversality condition: 
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and where ∏   Note that this transversality condition is implied by the 
consumer’s transversality condition: in the limit, the government can only issue debt if agents 
are prepared to hold it.  The PVBC says that the present value of future net surpluses must be 









Equation (3) represents a typical money demand equation, and can be regarded as the ratio of 
the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of money balances (or more simply 
as a cash-in-advance constraint). 
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  7The quantity-theoretic tradition regards this equation as crucial for the determination of 
prices, given output (or consumption)  , the nominal interest rate  , and the level of the 
money stock  , which is determined (voluntarily or otherwise) by the central bank. 
t Y t i
t M
 
The quantity theory under monetary leadership envisages a situation in which the decisions 
on the sequence of money supplies Stackelberg lead those on the sequence of primary 
surpluses.  In this set-up therefore the given money stock determines the period price level 
via equation (3) (and hence the real value of the government’s outstanding liabilities 
).  Monetary policy determines the seigniorage sequence 
, while the sequence of primary surpluses,   is 
determined essentially by residual to ensure the PVBC is met.   
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The quantity theory under fiscal leadership retains (3) as the equation determining the price 
level, however Sargent and Wallace (1981) argue that de facto control of the money supply 
may pass to the fiscal authorities.  They envisage a situation where the fiscal authority 
pursues an unsustainable fiscal policy.  That is, it pre-commits to a sequence of tax and 
expenditure plans   that require it to issue ever-increasing amounts of debt.  They 
argue that, if the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy, at some point the 
government will be unable to sell this debt, and the monetary authority will be required to 
finance the deficient budget via seigniorage revenue.  The PVBC is then met, and the 
equilibrium price level is still determined by (3), although the base money stock is not 
determined by the monetary authorities anymore.   
) ( s s s g P − τ
 
  8Both the above approaches to the quantity theory constitute a broad consensus that the 
ultimate determinant of inflation is the growth in the base money stock, (whether we face 
fiscal or monetary leadership).  For example, much time series evidence is presented in 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), while Lucas (1996) reviews cross sectional evidence.  Indeed 
Lucas (1996) suggests that few macroeconomic theories are as consistent with the data as is 
the quantity theory.  
 
The essence then of both quantity-theoretic views is that (1) holds for any initial (nominal) 
stock of debt and for all sequences of interest rates and price levels.  If fiscal policy is set to 
ensure that the PVBC does hold for all these sequences, we follow Woodford in describing 
such a regime as Ricardian.  In this case, the PVBC has no implications for the price level
( ) 6 . 
 
The final approach to price determination is the fiscal theory.  This view is based directly on 
equation (1).  Note that from the perspective of date t the stock of outstanding nominal 
government liabilities,  , is a predetermined magnitude.  The fiscal approach argues 
that the sequence of net surpluses   and seigniorage revenue   is 
generally not co-ordinated as the quantity theory assumes.  Such a regime can therefore be 
described as non-Ricardian.  As a consequence the price level (or the interest rate) must shift 
so that the PVBC is nonetheless met in equilibrium.   In this set-up equation (3) is essentially 
redundant as far as determination of the price level is concerned. 
t t M B +
) ( s s s g P − τ s s s s m P i i )] 1 /( [ 1 1 + + +
 
The intuition behind the fiscal theory is best explained by a simple example.  Consider a 
fiscal shock in the form of a deficit that is not expected to be met in present value terms by 
increases in tax.  At the initial price level, it would be optimal for consumption to rise, both 
now and in the future, since agents now have a larger consumption set available.  In other 
  9words, bond holders experience a positive wealth effect.  In the case of perfectly flexible 
prices (with output at its “full employment” level), the price level will then “jump” 
sufficiently to ensure that the PVBC holds. 
 
In the empirically more plausible case of some sluggishness in the price level an additional 
channel is present to ensure that (1) holds in equilibrium.  Here, the government may 
engineer a reduction in the real interest rate
( ) 7  that it faces in servicing its debt.  As a 
consequence, it reduces the size of the future net surpluses that is required to meet the 
existing net liabilities. 
 
2.2  Empirical implications 
 
We now set out the empirical implications of the three approaches to the determination of the 
price level.
( ) 8   We should mention from the start that direct testing of the fiscal theory is not 
straightforward and illustrate this first with an example.  Consider a regression of the 
government budget surplus on the previous period’s stock of debt, and assume the estimated 
coefficient is positive.  This is insufficient to distinguish between a fiscal policy that is 
Ricardian - where the government is viewed as systematically retiring outstanding debt 
(Bohn, 1998a) - and one that may be non-Ricardian, in which lagged debt is merely 
forecasting future surpluses (Woodford, 1998).   
 
Second, we acknowledge and emphasise the importance of a point raised by Woodford 
(1998b) in the context of analysing the fiscal theory empirically; a single-equation approach 
is unlikely to be sufficient to disentangle the impact of monetary and fiscal variables on the 
price level.  Again, consider the previous example regarding the feedback of debt last period 
  10onto the surplus in the current period.  In order to distinguish the rivalling explanations of the 
price level we need to characterise the effects of government debt on surpluses, as well as on 
prices.  A natural characterisation of a non-Ricardian regime is that surpluses evolve 
independently of the (predetermined) level of debt (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1997), 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000)), but also that, for given surpluses, the price level should be 
affected by the outstanding stock of debt.  But if budget surpluses are expected to rise in the 
future, such a regime would lead to an observed positive relationship between current (or 
lagged) debt and future surpluses, and adjustment (to meet the PVBC) could be obtained 
without a change or via a drop in the price level.  In contrast, a Ricardian regime suggests 
that surpluses will always be positively related to debt (at some horizon) and that debt and 
prices should evolve independently.  The PVBC holds independently of the path of prices, 
which is ultimately determined by the base money supply.  Whether these joint relationships 
between national debt and surpluses and between debt and the price level hold in the UK data 
will therefore be a key issue to examine below. 
 
To help distinguish further the opposing explanations of the price level we also analyse how 
excess money balances (defined as actual money holdings relative to their equilibrium level, 
see section 4.2 for details of interpretation) are transmitted through the economy.  The 
quantity theory (or Ricardian) view is that prices will ultimately rise.  But a positive 
relationship between money and prices may also be perfectly consistent with a non-Ricardian 
regime
( ) 9 .  In the non-Ricardian view, a positive correlation between money and prices would 
be explained by causation running from prices to money.  The rise in the price level would, 
however, ultimately be due to a rise in government debt, where the price level adjusts to 
make the PVBC hold in equilibrium.  
 
  11The quantity theoretic approach under monetary and fiscal leadership provides us with fairly 
clear empirical implications, but again it is crucial that these relationships hold 
simultaneously.  Specifically, for the quantity theoretical explanation of the price level to be 
consistent with the data, three key correlations are relevant.  First, the level of national debt 
has a positive effect on the price level, and second, national debt also has a positive effect on 
the monetary base.  Either, or both, of these correlations would seem to legitimise the 
concerns raised by Sargent and Wallace.
( ) 10   Third, the monetary base and the price level 
should be positively related, once we condition on fiscal variables. 
 
A maintained hypothesis of the fiscal theory is that all data (at whatever frequency) are 
equilibrium observations.  Consequently, Cochrane (1998) has argued that we can never 
observe causality in the data since all we observe, in terms of our equations, are (1) and (3).  
Since we never see off-equilibrium values we have no way of identifying whether the 
dominant influence was monetary or fiscal policy.  Others have taken a more optimistic view 
on the use of actual data for assessment of the fiscal theory.  For example, Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000), building on discussions by Woodford (1998) and Canzoneri, Cumby and 
Diba (1997), emphasise the need to incorporate additional identifying assumptions into any 
empirical analysis.  Christiano and Fitzgerald (op.  cit.) note comments by B. Friedman 
(quoted in Cochrane (1998)) pointing out that the quantity theory also has no implications for 
the time series of money growth and inflation in the absence of additional assumptions.   
Indeed a large part of Fisher (1911) is devoted to spelling out just these additional 
assumptions.  Researchers in the past have appeared willing to make a variety of such 
assumptions.  See, for example, the discussion of the cross section evidence on the quantity 
theory presented by Lucas (1996).  Similarly, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) Fisher (1911) 
and indeed before them Hume (1906) argue that monetary impulses affect the economy with 
  12‘long and variable’ lags.  In other words, it has long been widely acknowledged that 
estimating an equation like (1) without recognising the importance of lags would be a poor 
basis for explaining inflation.  In addition, as Bohn (1998b) notes, such lags are also likely to 
be important, even if fiscal policy is the dominant causal influence in the determination of 
prices.  In that case Bohn argues one ought to see prices rise in the wake of a run up in debt.  
In our empirical analysis we are apt to adopt that perspective and interpret the error-
correction terms as capturing these lags.  Our evidence, with respect to the fiscal theory is 
therefore at best preliminary, but not without use in the search for additional identifying 
assumptions. 
 
To summarise, we are interested in analysing jointly several key feedbacks in the data to 
assess different views on the evolution of the price level.  We use the combination of 
observed correlations to decide on the plausibility of the various theories examined.  First, 
how does debt affect future surpluses?  Second, how does debt affect the price level?  Third, 
can we detect an effect from national debt on the monetary base?  Fourth, how do these 
feedbacks change when we introduce money into the system?  And finally, in that 
framework, does the monetary base affect the price level and is there any evidence of 
‘reverse’ causation from prices to money?  
 
 
3.  Data Sources and Construction 
 
Our analysis of fiscal policy and prices in the UK uses annual data over the period 1702-
1996.  The appendix contains a detailed description of the data sources used for this paper, 
here we only provide an overview of the most important issues in the construction of the 
  13data.  The working paper version of this paper contains a more detailed analysis of the 
underlying data. 
 
Note that we need a market value series for the UK national debt.  This is an implication of 
equation (1).  Previous researchers using the long run of UK debt data have restricted 
themselves to par values only
( ) 11 .  We construct a long run of market value data as follows.  
Post-1949 market values of UK government debt are taken from the ONS’s Annual Abstract 
of Statistics.  For the period between 1900 and 1949 we calculate the market value of each 
individual government bond issue as the product of its price and outstanding stock (recorded 
in Pember and Boyle, 1950)
( ) 12 .  By adding these market values for all outstanding bond 
issues we approximately obtain the total market value of national debt at the end of each 
year
( ) 13 .  
 
Before 1900 only par values of government debt are available.  We calculate a proxy for the 
actual market value of the government debt   at the end of period  v B 1 − t  as the ratio of the 
coupon interest rate on Consols 
( c
14)
  and the Consol yield 
( ) i
15  (both during period t), 
multiplied by the par value ( ) of all outstanding government debt at the end of period 




1 , 1 , ) ( − − = t p t t t v B i c B  
 
This approximation of the market value of government debt is based on the assumption that 
most of the debt issued before 1900 had a long maturity.  Chart 1 compares our proxy for the 
market value of government debt with the data available from Pember and Boyle (op cit) 
  14between 1900 and 1940 (the latter both including and excluding the value of unquoted 
government bond issues).  Unquoted debt
( ) 16  accounted for around 15% of the total value of 
government debt until the first world war.  During the First World War the share of unquoted 
debt rose to around 30%, and to 50% during the Second World War.  Our calculated series is 
similar to the series excluding unquoted debt for most of the first four decades of this 
century.  This suggests that our calculations provide a reasonably good approximation to the 
actual market valuation of the national debt, especially in the pre-1900 era, which is the only 
period for which we use this approximation. 
 
Chart 1 












1900 1903 1906 1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939
Pember and Boyle including unquoted debt
Authors' calculations




Both series start to diverge slightly from the early 1920s onwards.  This is largely due to the 
interest rate on newly issued government bonds being above the consol rate, which makes the 
consol rate less appropriate as a proxy for the interest return on government debt.  The 
  15average maturity of government bonds also fell at that time, which further compromises the 
role of the consol rate as a proxy for the actual return on the debt in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Another complication in the construction of our time series for government debt (both par 
and market values) is the dating of the observations.  The data for government debt are 
recorded at the end of each financial year, which does not necessarily correspond to the end 
of a calendar year.  All other data used in this paper are recorded at the end of each calendar 
year.  We therefore follow Barro’s (1987) convention in dating government debt: if the 
financial year ends in the first half of the year we treat that value as the stock at the end of the 
previous calendar year.  If the financial year ends in the second half of the year we record the 
stock of debt as that of the end of the current calendar year.  For details on the end of 
financial years see Barro (op cit) and endnote 13.  There was no financial year in 1800, since 
the financial year 1798-1799 ended on October 10
th and the financial year 1799-1801 ended 
on January 5
th.  The stock of debt for 1800 was therefore obtained via interpolation. 
 
 
4.  A framework to analyse money, debt and prices in the UK 
 
4.1 Empirical  approach 
 
Given the theoretical discussion in section 2, we are interested in explaining the evolution of 
the primary surplus, seigniorage/the money stock, inflation and the (long) real interest rate.  
We include the latter since in the fiscal theory of the price level the presence of sticky prices 
means that the authorities may try to reduce the real interest rate as a way to reduce the 
required future budget surpluses.  We begin our empirical analysis by identifying the low 
  16frequency (i.e., long run) relationships in the data, for base money and government debt.  
Once we have identified the long-run relationships, we nest them, as state variables (i.e., 
lagged one period), in a dynamic (or short-run) reduced-form Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) 
model, and look for the feedbacks mentioned above
( ) 17.  Of course, the econometric rationale 
for including deviations of variables from their underlying equilibrium determinants in the 
dynamic VAR is that this approach allows us to specify the system in  space.   ) 0 ( I
 
In practice we analyse two versions of the VAR: one without base money (1705-1996) and 
one including base money (1872-1996)
( ) 18 .  The first system focuses on the feedback between 
government debt, the primary surplus and inflation.  Specifically with respect to the fiscal 
theory, this can at best be interpreted as a partial analysis on two counts.  First, the fiscal 
theory is cast in terms of total government liabilities, i.e. base money plus nominal bonds.  
Second, we may find an important role for debt in explaining prices, but once we condition 
this relationship on money this effect might disappear.   
 
Our empirical approach initially distinguishes between money and bonds for two reasons.  
First, at a practical level, the time series for the market value of debt goes back to 1702, 
whereas data on the money base only start in 1870.  We are reluctant to ignore the 
information in this longer run of data.  Second, this distinction helps in our assessment of the 
concerns of Sargent and Wallace, as we are interested in examining whether money or debt is 
the dominant explanatory variable for inflation in the UK.  Nevertheless, in section 4.2 we 
also compute a measure of total government liabilities, so that the empirical set-up closely 
mimics that of the fiscal theory, and analyse the key feedbacks discussed in section 2.2.  
 
  17The first long-run equation establishes the steady-state relationship between money, output 
and short interest rates; this relationship can be interpreted as a long-run money demand 
equation.  The long-run relationship for national debt establishes a relationship between 
nominal debt and nominal GDP.  The system without money only contains the latter long-run 
relationship
( ) 19 .  Both systems also include a proxy for the output gap, which is instrumented 
using the stationary component of log real output as obtained via the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter
( ) 20 .  The output gap is included in order to pick up variations in monetary and fiscal 
policy associated with temporary variations in output.  We do not model output endogenously 
partly for practical reasons, but also for theoretical reasons.  Most empirical work indicates 
that this portion of output is influenced largely by “real factors”, (see for example the 
discussion in Woodford (2000)).  In the language of real business cycle theory it is 
predominantly due to exogenous changes in technology (along with cyclical variation in 
capacity utilisation)
( ) 21 .  Variations in output at the business cycle frequencies due to shifts in 
fiscal or monetary policy are generally thought to be of second-order significance.  
 
Over the period of the gold standard (taken to be 1821-1930) we estimate the system without 
money (after re-estimating the long-run relationship for national debt) and replace the 
inflation rate by the change in the exchange rate. 
 
4.2 
  18Results 
 
VAR without money (1705-1996) 
The detailed results of our empirical analysis are attached in Appendix 2, which shows the 
specific systems we estimated across our different sample periods.  Here, we discuss the main 
results.  The lag length of the VAR was established in the usual way for each sample and 
system.  In all cases this was one.  In the long run the restriction that the real market value of 
government debt ( ) r b
( ) 22  is homogeneous in real GDP ( ) cannot be rejected (see also 
Hendry, 2000):  
r y
 
r r y b =         p-value = 0.2606  2654 . 1 ) 1 (
2 = χ
 
The one overidentifying restriction is clearly accepted at conventional significance levels.  
Since data on the monetary base are not available for the whole sample period, we can only 
analyse the first two feedbacks discussed in section 2.2.  First, the government’s primary 
surplus is positively related to last period’s debt overhang; the response coefficient is 0.01 
(and significant at the 1% level).  On a Ricardian interpretation, this suggests that UK 
governments tend to pay off their existing debt, and meet the PVBC all the time.  As Janssen 
and Nolan (1999) argue, it is also consistent with optimising tax-smoothing behaviour on the 
part of governments.  A non-Ricardian view would be that debt is anticipating future 
innovations in the surplus.  To help distinguish between these competing views we need 
additional evidence from other regression results.   
 
The key explanatory variables in the inflation equation are the output gap, real interest rates 
and lagged inflation (all of which have a positive effect on inflation).  The positive 
  19coefficient in long real rates is counter-intuitive and may be accounted for by the fact that 
long real interest rates are a predictor of future activity.  In any case, when we include money 
in the system this result disappears.  The debt variable is highly insignificant. 
 
Overall, we interpret these initial results as suggesting that prices and debt evolve 
independently.  A better-founded decision on whether the fiscal policy regime affects prices, 
however, can be taken when monetary base data are included in the VAR system. 
 
VAR with Money (1872-1996) 
When the monetary base is incorporated into the system, the sample period runs from 1872 to 
1996.
( ) 23   We re-estimate the (two) long-run relationships (in money and in debt).  After 
imposing some overidentifying restrictions we obtain the following long-run money demand 
equation:  s r i y p m 27 . 0 − =  and the same long-run equation for real debt and real GDP as 
before:  .  These overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at the usual significance 
levels (  with a p-value of 0.2394).  The estimated interest semi-elasticity of 
the demand for the monetary base is similar to estimates by Janssen (1998) for the UK over 
the period 1972-1997 with quarterly data and by Chadha, Haldane and Janssen (1998) over 
the period 1872-1995 using annual data.  Chart 2 shows the residuals from the long-run 
relationships for the monetary base (Mgap) and debt (Bgap). 
r r y b =
2123 . 4 ) 3 ( 2 = χ
 
The VAR including the lagged residuals from the money and debt long-run relationships 
shows the following effects.  The lagged residual from the long-run money demand 
relationship affects real monetary base growth significantly negatively.  This error-correction 
mechanism indicates that we have indeed identified a long-run money demand relationship.  
  20The lagged deviation of real government debt from real GDP has an insignificant effect on 
real monetary base growth, whereas the lagged primary surplus has a significant negative 
effect.  This suggests that significant Sargent and Wallace type debt monetisation effects did 
not occur over our sample period.  There is also evidence of a liquidity effect as monetary 
base growth appears to have negative effects on real interest rates. 
 
Chart 2 
Residuals from long-run relationships for monetary base (Mgap) and debt (Bgap) 











We find a number of interesting results.  First, we observe (as in the VAR without money) 
significant and positive feedback from national debt on to the primary surplus.  The equation 
for the surplus to GDP ratio is robust across all models and sample periods, in particular the 
feedback from debt to the surplus is virtually unchanged and remains significant at the 1% 
level (see the column labelled “Surplus:GDP” in Appendix 2).  Second, inflation is now 
  21largely explained by monetary factors; both excess money balances and lagged growth in the 
real monetary base.  The effect of real interest rates on inflation is significantly negative.  
Both the output gap and government debt remain insignificant for inflation.  All of these 
findings are consistent with quantity-theoretic explanations of the price level.  Third, lagged 
inflation is (insignificantly) negatively related to money growth, suggesting that there is little 
or no evidence of ‘reverse’ causation from prices to money.  Finally, debt does not appear to 
have affected prices either “directly” or via the debt monetisation channel; the coefficient on 
debt in the real money growth equation is -0.01, with a p-value of 0.41.).  We interpret this as 
suggesting that the quantity theory under fiscal leadership does not hold over the sample 
period examined here and that the quantity theory under monetary leadership provides the 
most likely explanation of inflation in the UK.  
 
VAR under the Gold Standard  
The fiscal theory also has important implications for exchange rate policy.  Canzoneri et al. 
(1999) exposit the unfeasibility of pegging exchange rates via monetary means when fiscal 
policy is non-Ricardian.  From around 1821 to 1930 the Pound was pegged to the value of 
gold. 
 
After re-estimation of the respective long-run relationships in the data, we examine a VAR 
without money (again because of data limitations), but with the change in the US 
Dollar/Pound exchange rate included instead of inflation.  Again, we find significant 
feedback from debt onto the primary surplus.  We also find that debt plays no role in the 
exchange rate equation, although we acknowledge that the change in the exchange rate is 
poorly explained over this period, so these results may not provide additional evidence either 
way.  
  22 
VAR with total government liabilities 
Strictly speaking, the fiscal theory examines the effects of total government liabilities on the 
price level.  We define total liabilities as the sum of the market value of government debt and 
the monetary base.  In the VARs analysed above the two components of government 
liabilities are included as separate variables, in order to allow for the possibility that debt has 
a more circuitous effect on inflation, via growth in the monetary base.  Since we do not find 
any evidence in favour of either the fiscal theory or the quantity theory under fiscal 
leadership we re-estimate the VAR over the period 1872-1996 after adding the two types of 
government liabilities into one measure.  The long-run relationship for total liabilities is 
defined as the sum of the two separate long-run relationships identified previously.  Of 
course, in this framework we can at best test whether the fiscal theory is consistent with the 
data, but we cannot analyse the quantity theory at all, since we do not distinguish monetary 
data as a separate variable.  
 
Again, the feedback from these total liabilities to the primary surplus is significant (at the 5% 
level) with a coefficient of 0.01, close to the estimate in the system with money as a separate 
variable.  Total liabilities are insignificant (p-value=0.64) in the equation for inflation.  The 
feedbacks found suggest that the fiscal theory does not explain the price level in the UK over 
the period analysed.  Overall, our results over different sample periods are consistent with the 
traditional quantity theory under monetary leadership, where the monetary base appears to 
explain the price level.  But when the monetary base is added to national debt, total liabilities 
do not affect prices at all. 
5.  Discussion and Conclusions  
 
  23In this paper we analyse the plausibility of three explanations of the path of the price level 
using annual data for the UK.  In addition to the traditional quantity theory of money, we 
examine whether a rise in the market value of national debt precedes an increase in the 
monetary base and in inflation, as envisaged by Sargent and Wallace (op. cit.).  We also take 
a tentative first look at some evidence on the fiscal theory of the price level.  To do this, we 
estimate several reduced-form VARs.  The empirical analysis focuses on interactions 
between government debt, the government's primary surplus, the price level and the monetary 
base.  A key result, over all sample periods analysed, is that surpluses and debt are 
significantly positively correlated, consistent with the government’s PVBC holding all the 
time.  Government debt appears insignificant in explaining inflation.  When we add money to 
the VAR system these results are not affected, and debt is not significant in explaining 
monetary base growth.  Indeed, our inflation equation appears better specified when money is 
added to the system.   
 
The key relationships analysed in this paper provide some interesting findings.  First, both the 
relationship between the surplus and government debt, and that between the monetary base 
and inflation are robust across time periods.  Second, the first of these relations at least, is 
entirely consistent with recent results found with US data (Bohn (1998), Canzoneri et al. 
(1997), and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000)).  This may suggest some agreement as to the 
stylised facts over long periods of time and in different economies.  Third, the data do not 
confirm at least some of the implications of the Sargent-Wallace story.  In particular, a rise in 
debt does not appear to influence growth in the monetary base.  Fourth, if one accepts that 
debt might affect prices only with a lag, as suggested by Bohn (1998), even if the fiscal 
theory is “correct”, then our results indicate that more conventional explanations of inflation 
are more consistent with the data.  However, for the reader who does not accept this 
  24“identifying restriction” our results provide little direct evidence for or against the fiscal 
theory. 
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  30Appendix 1 
 
Econometric approach 
Our econometric approach is straightforward.  We model inflation as arising from three 
sources of excess demand (see also Metin, 1995 and Hendry, 2000), which reflect monetary, 
fiscal and real disequilibria.  In practice, inflation may also be influenced by short-run 
interactions between variables, and our approach permits such interactions.  
 
First, we estimate and identify the three equilibrium relationships.  The money and 
government debt relationships are estimated in unrestricted VARs.  Each of these VARs can 
be reparameterised as a vector error correction mechanism (VECM) to distinguish the long-
run relationships among the variables qt (see section 4.1 for the variables used in the money 
and debt relationships) from the short-run dynamics.  The VECMs for money and 











1    (A1) 
 
We use Johansen’s maximum likelihood estimation procedure (Johansen, 1988 and 1991, 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990) to test for the rank of the matrix Π.  If it is less than full rank, 
this test is used to determine the number of cointegrating relationships between the variables 
in the two respective VARs: 
 
We impose some non-testable coefficient restrictions (the minimum number required for 
exact identification) plus overidentifying restrictions to determine the cointegrating vectors.  
  31When some of the variables are cointegrated the matrix Π can be decomposed into two other 











1 '    (A2) 
 
where β′ is the matrix of coefficients of the cointegrating vectors and α is the matrix of 
loading coefficients.  The former can be interpreted as the long-run relationships in the 
respective systems and the latter determine the feedback of deviations from these long-run 
equilibria onto the dynamics of the endogenous variables (the error-correction terms). 
 
In contrast to the first two long-run relationships, the output gap is instrumented using the 
deviation of actual output from its trend, as generated by the Hodrick/Prescott filter.  
 
After identification of these three excess demand relationships the second stage encompasses 
both the lagged deviations from the long-run equilibria ( 1 ' − t q β ), as well as the lagged effects 
from a vector of stationary endogenous variables ( ), as described in section 4.1.  In general 
terms, the endogenous variables   can then be modelled as their expectation, conditional on 
an information set  , which consists of long and short-run elements, and can formally be 
expressed as follows: 
t v
t v
i t I −
 
) | ( 1 − t t I v E           ( A 3 )  
where ] ' , [ 1 1 − − − = t i t t q v I β  
 
  32The resulting reduced-form system (which is now defined in I(0) space and the results of 











1 ' γβ η    (A4) 
 
where γ  now denotes the matrix of loading coefficients of the long-run disequilibria for the 
stationary variables  .  v
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Regressors: Surplus:GDP   
St




St-1 0.82*** 0.06  -0.06 
Lrt-1 0.18** 0.50*** 0.46*** 
DLpt-1 0.11 0.02  0.96*** 
Y-gapt-1 0.01 -0.79***  0.80*** 
B-gapt-1 0.01*** -0.00  0.00 
Constant  -0.35 1.40** -1.24* 
S.E.  3.10 5.08  5.10 
 









Regressors: Surplus:GDP   
St






St-1 0.83*** -0.03  -0.04  -0.22** 
Lrt-1 0.19** 0.51***  -0.30***  0.25** 
DLpt-1 0.17* -0.19*  0.63***  -0.21 
Y-gapt-1 -0.05 -0.37***  -0.04  0.00 
B-gapt-1 0.01** 0.01  -0.00  -0.01 
DMt-1 -0.06 -0.37***  0.50***  -0.17 
M-gapt-1 0.00 0.01  0.02**  -0.02** 
Constant  -0.76 2.42*** 2.28***  0.34 
S.E.  3.81 4.09  4.41  5.04 
 






Regressors: Surplus:GDP   
St
Real interest rate 
Lrt
Change in Exchange Rate 
Dlet
St-1 0.70*** 0.24**  0.18 
Lrt-1 0.03 0.37***  -0.01 
DLet-1 -0.02 0.05  -0.09 
Y-gapt-1 -0.03 -0.59***  -0.11 
B-gapt-1 0.02*** 0.00  -0.00 
Constant  0.79** 1.26**  -0.45 
S.E.  2.95 4.92  7.47 
 
 






Regressors: Surplus:GDP   
St




St-1 0.84*** 0.10*  -0.20*** 
Lrt-1 0.16* 0.44***  -0.18 
DLpt-1 0.16** 0.03  0.43*** 
Y-gapt-1 -0.05 -0.44***  0.02 
Liab-gapt-1 0.01* 0.01  0.00 
Constant  -0.45 1.44** 2.56*** 
S.E.  3.82 4.26  4.86 
 
Note:  *   significant at the 10% level 
  **  significant at the 5% level  
  *** significant at the 1% level  
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Endnotes 
(1) A referee pointed out that some aspects of this debate were anticipated in the formulation 
of the UK Medium Term Financial Strategy; see for example Ball and Burns (1976) or Burns 
and Budd (1977).  A clear analytical overview is Jackson (1990). 
(2) The key contributions include Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), (1998), Woodford (1994), 
(1996), (1998), Canzoneri et al, (1997, 1999), Bergin (1995), Cochrane (1998) 
(3) Woodford defines a non-Ricardian regime as a fiscal policy that retains the PVBC only as 
an equilibrium condition.  A Ricardian regime is characterised by policy mechanisms that 
ensure the PVBC holds for all sequences of prices and interest rates.  See our discussion 
below. 
(4) Sims (1998), Bergin (op cit) and Woodford (1996) use the fiscal approach to discuss the 
importance of the Stability Pact for inflation control in the Euro-area. 
(5) We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the following taxonomy.  
(6) Canzoneri et al. (1999) spell out in detail a class of fiscal policies (feedbacks from debt 
onto the surplus) that meet the Ricardian criterion.  It turns out that these can be fairly lax, 
with higher surpluses being used only infrequently to retire existing debt.  Indeed, in 
principle such policy rules could be invisible to the econometric eye.  As we will show 
below, the government's primary surplus and the market value of its debt are strongly 
correlated in the UK. 
(7) That is, the nominal interest rate is raised, but by an amount insufficient to avoid a fall in 
the real interest rate. 
(8) In the empirical part of the paper all variables used are I(0), which implies that we analyse 
the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy and inflation. 
(9) In the working paper version of this paper we consider further examples of this sort.  
(10) Of course, the absence of any such effects need not indicate that those concerns are ill-
founded, as institutional factors may be in place that keep in check any pressures from fiscal 
policy onto monetary policy.  That interpretation would be consistent with policy proposals 
aimed at restraining aggregate fiscal policy, as in the Euro Growth and Stability Pact. 
(11) See for example Barro (1987) or Ahmed and Rogers (1995).   
(12) The stock data from Pember and Boyle are recorded at the end of the financial year (31
st 
March), whereas the price data are measured at the end of each calendar year.  ONS data on 
market values are recorded at the end of the financial year.  This implies that there is a nine-
month gap between the recorded stock and price data over the period 1900-1949.   
(13) Part of the national debt is unquoted, which (in the case of the UK) means that this debt 
is not quoted on the London Stock Exchange.  This means that we have no information about 
the market prices of these bond issues.  For the calculation of the total market value of 
government debt we can therefore only include these bonds at par value. 
(14) We take into account the effects of Goschen’s conversion of the national debt in 1888, 
such that the coupon rate fell from 3% before 1889 to 2.5% from 1889 onwards (see Harley, 
1976 for details). 
(15) The consol yield indicates the market’s discount rate. 
(16) See endnote 14 for an explanation of unquoted debt.   
(17) Details about the econometric approach can be found in Appendix 1. 
(18) A consistent measure of the stock of base money is available from 1870 onwards only 
(source: Capie and Webber, 1985).  
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(19) Over most of the sample periods examined, the data suggest a third long-run 
relationship, which can be identified as a term-structure equation.  Again, this hardly affects 
the main results, so we only report the basic system. 
(20) Similar results were obtained by linear de-trending of the output series.  We also 
instrumented the output gap using bandpassed-filtered output, using both the Baxter-King 
and the Christiano-Fitzgerald filters.  Our results hardly changed.  In practice the correlation 
coefficient between these different filters was around 0.85.  Relative to the HP filter the 
Bandpass filters remove high frequency variation and are probably more appealing.  
Nevertheless the HP filter is more widely understood and we report results using that filter. 
(21) See for example King and Rebelo (1999) on capacity utilisation, Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) on the size of real shocks relative to monetary shocks, and 
Blanchard and Perotti NBER Working Paper No. 7269, July 1999 on the relative importance 
of fiscal policy shocks.  
(22) We use the CPI deflator to obtain a time series for real government debt, since the GDP 
deflator is only available from 1855 onwards.  This does not affect the long-run relationship 
between real debt and real output, however. 
(23) We also estimate the previous VAR system without money over the shorter sample 
period, but the results are similar to those over the longer period (see working paper version).  
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